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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
PAUL HOUGHTON, et al., 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
v. 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, et al., 
Defendants/Appellees. 
Case No. 20030931-SC 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS - APPELLEES 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
In an Order filed on November 3,2003, the district court ruled on several related 
discovery motions. R. 1718-22. The district court granted the defendants' motion for a 
protective order and denied the remaining discovery motions. R. 1720. Plaintiffs filed a 
petition for permission to appeal this interlocutory order which was granted by this Court 
on January 15,2004. Interlocutory appeals, such as this, come within the original 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the State of Utah under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(3)0) (2002). The Court is without subject matter jurisdiction because no notice of 
claim was filed by any remaining member of the certified class and the only notice of 
claim that was filed did not raise the attorney fees issue presented by this appeal. Rushton 
v. Salt Lake County. 1999 UT 36, fl8,977 P.2d 1201. 
1 
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. This appeal should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because 
of the named plaintiffs failure to file a notice of claim that raised the attorney fees issue 
that they seek to raise and because no notice of claim was filed by the unnamed plaintiffs. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: A lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at 
any time by either party or by the court. Weiser v. Union Pacific R.R. Co.. 932 P.2d 596, 
597 (Utah 1997). Failure to comply with the notice of claim requirements of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act deprives a court of subject matter jurisdiction. Thomas v. 
Lewis. 2001 UT 49, ^[20,26 P.3d 217. "In matters of pure statutory interpretation, an 
appellate court reviews a trial court's ruling for correctness and gives no deference to its 
legal conclusions." Stephens v. Bonneville Travel Inc.. 935 P.2d 518, 519 (Utah 1997). 
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW. This issue was raised by the defendants' 
motions to dismiss (R. 753-801,924-962,979-987,1027-1037) that were denied by the 
district court. R. 1288-89. 
2 This Court should not issue an advisory opinion as to how State v. McCoy. 2000 
UT 39,999 P.2d 572 should be applied to hypothetical situations where no concrete set of 
facts are before the Court 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue is unique to the appeal and does not call 
for the review of the district court's decision. 
2 
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3. The district court did not abuse its discretion in its challenged ruling on 
discovery motions. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "Because trial courts have broad discretion in 
matters of discovery, this issue is reviewed for abuse of discretiono" Green v. Louden 
2001 UT 62, K37,29 P.3d 638; Pack v. Case, 2001 UT App 232, J16,30 P.3d 436 (denial 
of a motion to compel discovery is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard). 
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW: The district court ruled on the relevant discovery 
motions in its Order filed on November 3,2003. R. 1718-22. 
4. The district court's challenged discovery Order correctly interpreted this 
Court's decision in McCoy. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "In matters of pure statutory interpretation, an 
appellate court reviews a trial court's ruling for correctness and gives no deference to its 
legal conclusions.11 Stephens v. Bonneville Travel Inc.. 935 P.2d 518, 519 (Utah 1997). 
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW: See Issue Three, supra. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7. Action or claim by recipient — Consent of 
department required - Department's right to intervene — 
Department's interests protected - Attorney's fees and costs. (1998) 
(1) (a) A recipient may not file a claim, commence an action, or settle, 
compromise, release, or waive a claim against a third party for recovery of 
medical costs for an injury, disease, or disability for which the department 
has provided or has become obligated to provide medical assistance, 
without the department's written consent, 
(b) The department has an unconditional right to intervene in an action 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
commenced by a recipient for recovery of medical costs connected with the 
same injury, disease, or disability, for which it has provided or has become 
obligated to provide medical assistance. 
(2) (a) If the recipient proceeds without the department's written consent as 
required by Subsection (l)(a), the department is not bound by any decision, 
judgment, agreement, or compromise rendered or made on the claim or in 
the action. 
(b) The department may recover in full from the recipient or any party to 
which the proceeds were made payable all medical assistance which it has 
provided and retains its right to commence an independent action against 
the third party, subject to Subsection 26-19-5(3). 
(3) The department's written consent, if given, shall state under what terms 
the interests of the department may be represented in an action commenced 
by the recipient. 
(4) The department may not pay more than 33% of its total recovery for 
attorney's fees, but shall pay a proportionate share of the costs in an action 
that is commenced with the department's written consent. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12 Claim against state or its employee - Time 
for filing notice. (Supp. 2003) 
A claim against the state, or against its employee for an act or omission occurring 
during the performance of the employee's duties, within the scope of employment, 
or under color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim is filed with the 
attorney general within one year after the claim arises, or before the expiration of 
any extension of time granted under Section 63-30-11, regardless of whether or not 
the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This complaint was filed on October 27,1995. R. 1-47. In their complaint, the 
plaintiffs made various challenges to Utah's Medicaid Benefits Recovery Act. The 
complaint sought the certification of two classes of plaintiffs. By an Order filed on 
January 29,1996, the district court certified the following two classes. 
Class I plaintiffs are represented by Paul Houghton. This class is defined as 
individuals injured by the acts of a third party, who became Medicaid 
4 
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recipients, and whose medical bills were paid in part by the State of Utah, 
through the Utah State Department of Health. These class members are 
also defined by the fact that they had a third-party liability ("TPL") action 
against the person or entity who or which injured them, resulting in the 
imposition or priority claim on a lien by the State of Utah pursuant to the 
Medical Benefits Recovery Act, UCA §26-19-1, et seq. Class I defendants 
are further defined by the fact that none of them had counsel in their 
dealings or negotiations with the State of Utah regarding the claim or lein, 
which was paid on a first priority basis from the proceeds of their TPL 
claim. 
Class II plaintiffs are identical in every respect to Class I plaintiffs 
with the following exceptions: Class II plaintiffs retained counsel and 
actually filed actions or made claims through attorneys, against the liable 
third parties. In most or all cases, these attorneys were involved in the 
negotiations with the State of Utah regarding payment of the lien claims by 
the state. 
R. 99-100. 
Pursuant to a motion of the defendants, the plaintiffs' lawyers were disqualified by 
an order of the district court filed on July 30,1996. R. 280-99. On appeal, this Court 
Teversed the district court's decision. Houghton v. Dep't of Health. 962 P.2d 58 (Utah 
1998)(HoughtonI). 
On remand, after numerous motions, the district court dismissed this action with 
prejudice as to both classes on all issues on November 13,2000. R. 707-9. On appeal, 
this Court affirmed the dismissal of all the Class I plaintiffs challenges to the 
constitutionality of the act. Houghton v. Dep't of Health. 2002 UT 101, f 11, 57 P.3d 
1067 ffloughton ID. This Court affirmed the dismissal of all of the claims of the Class II 
plaintiffs as well with the exception of the attorney fees claims. 14 These attorney fees 
claims were remanded to the district court for further proceedings. 
5 
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It was undisputed that the named Class II plaintiffs attorney fees claims failed on 
the merits. R. 508, 513, 515, 556-58; Houghton II. 2002 UT 101 at1f6. The question on 
appeal was whether the class should have been dismissed without prejudice because of 
this failure,1 or the matter remanded for discovery and naming of appropriate class 
representatives. This Court chose the second alternative. Id. at f^ 10. 
On remand, the defendants moved to dismiss the remaining claims for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction. R. 753-801, 924-962, 979-987, 1027-1037. The district court 
denied these motions and permitted the plaintiffs to add two new class representatives. R. 
1288-89. On November 3,2003, the district court ruled on several related discovery 
motions and the defendants' motion to decertify the remaining class of plaintiffs. 
R. 1718-22. The district court granted the defendants' motion for a protective order and 
denied the remaining discovery motions. R. 1720. It neither granted nor denied the 
defendants' motion to decertify the remaining class of plaintiffs. Instead, the court 
permitted limited discovery relating solely to the class certification issue. Id. Plaintiffs 
filed a petition for permission to appeal this interlocutory order which was granted by this 
Court on January 15,2004. 
1
 The defendants admitted that the dismissal with prejudice of the potential claims 
of the unnamed members of Class II (as opposed to the properly dismissed claims of the 
named plaintiffs) was in error. 
6 
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
A notice of claim was filed on July 20,1995 by plaintiffs Paul Houghton, Damian 
Henderson, Billie Henderson and Wayne Rubens. R. 37-39,792-95. No other plaintiffs 
filed a notice of claim. The plaintiffs' notice of claim does not identify any cause of 
action for attorney fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7(4) (1998). The complaint 
that was incorporated by reference into the notice of claim does not state such a claim. R. 
1-36. Such a claim is not found in the list of the relief requested by the plaintiffs. R. 34-
35-
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs' notice of claim was inadequate. It did not assert any claim for attorney 
fees under Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7(4) (1998). It did not include each plaintiffs name 
as required. This Court is therefore without subject matter jurisdiction to consider this 
appeal and should dismiss the same. 
Plaintiffs ask this Court to issue an advisory opinion. There is no factual setting to 
frame the legal question. No facts are known at this time concerning the circumstances or 
the potential claims of any member of the remaining plaintiff class. This Court should 
dismiss this appeal rather than issue a decision that could only be advisory. 
The challenged decision of the district court dealt with discovery. The court ruled 
on how much discovery would be permitted for the limited purpose of the defendants' 
7 
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motion to decertify the remaining class of plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have failed to show 
that the district court's decision was an abuse of discretion. 
The challenged decision of the district court simply followed the exact language of 
this Court's decision in McCoy. The court ruled that discovery could be had to determine 
how many Medicaid recipients had hired an "attorney to recover damages from a third 
party, and the State elect[ed] to recover its claim directly from the recipient." R. 1720. 
Neither McCoy nor the district court ruled on all possible permutations of factual issues 
that might arise under Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7(4) (1998). The district court's decision, 
on the limited issue addressed, followed the precedent of this Court and the court of 
appeals and should be affirmed on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
L THIS COURT IS WITHOUT SUBJECT MATTER 
JURISDICTION TO HEAR THIS APPEAL BECAUSE NO 
APPROPRIATE NOTICE OF CLAIM WAS FILED 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act governs the procedure for suing the State 
of Utah, its agencies, and its employees. Both this Court and the Utah Court of Appeals 
have held that the filing of the notice of claim required by the Act is a jurisdictional 
precondition to filing any suit against the state or its employees. Rushton v. Salt Lake 
County,!999 UT 36,1J18,977 P.2d 1201; Lamarr v. Utah State Dep't of Transp.. 828 
P.2d 535,540-42 (Utah App. 1992); Madsen v. Borthick. 769 P.2d 245,249-50 (Utah 
1988). Full (strict) compliance with the requirements of the Utah Governmental 
8 
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Immunity Act is essential to maintain a cause of action thereunder. Lamarr; Rushton, 
1999 UT 36, ^ 19; Scarborough v. Granite School District. 531 P.2d 480 (Utah 1975). 
At the relevant time, the Governmental Immunity Act required that: 
[a] claim against the state, or against its employee for an act or omission 
occurring during the performance of the employee's duties, within the scope 
of employment, or under color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim 
is filed with the attorney general within one year after the claim arises, 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12 (Supp. 2003) (in part). 
The only cause of action remaining is for attorney fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 26-19-7(4) (1998). The notice of claim only lists four individuals as plaintiffs. It did 
not include a claim for attorney fees pursuant to section 7. It has been undisputed that the 
four named plaintiffs do not possess a claim for attorney fees pursuant to this statute. The 
unnamed plaintiffs failed to file the necessary notice of claim. Even if the notice of claim 
that was filed were to be attributed to plaintiffs whose names do not appear in it, it would 
still be ineffective because the cause of action the plaintiffs now raise does not appear in 
the notice of claim that was filed. 
A. All Plaintiffs Names Must Appear in the Notice of Claim 
One of the mandatory requirements for a notice of claim is that it contain the 
names of all plaintiffs. 
The only notice of claim timely filed in this case listed only PGC and 
Mr. Roberts as claimants. Plaintiffs argue that this notice was sufficient 
for all plaintiffs because ff[t]here is no case law ... [that] asserts that the 
[A]ct requires a specific name to be on the notice of claim when all the 
governmental entities involved know who the plaintiffs are.'1 However, we 
9 
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note that the statute itself clearly requires any person filing suit against a 
government agency to file a notice of claim. In other words, each plaintiffs 
name must be on the notice of claim. Although the purpose of a notice of 
claim is to ffprovide[ ] the governmental entity an opportunity to correct the 
condition that caused the injury, evaluate the claim, and perhaps settle the 
matter without the expense of litigation," as plaintiffs themselves note, we 
have consistently held that those purposes are fulfilled only by the timely 
filing of a notice of claim-even when the entity charged had actual notice of 
the circumstances of the claim. See Longley v. Leucadia Fin. Corp.. 2000 
UT 69, \ 21,9 P.3d 762 (" 'We have consistently required strict compliance 
with the requirements of the Immunity Act. Actual notice does not cure a 
party's failure to meet these requirements.1" (quoting Rushton v. Salt Lake 
County.. 1999 UT 36, If 19,977 P.2d 1201)). Because the notice of claim 
filed in this case included only the claims of PGC and Mr. Roberts, we hold 
that it was insufficient to support the action in behalf of Lynn Clayson, 
Robert Cordner, Paul Carnesecca, Frank Camesecca, and Richard Bona. 
The claims of these plaintiffs were therefore properly dismissed. 
Pigs Gun Club. Inc. v. Sanpete County. 2002 UT 17, ^ [10,42 P.3d 379 (citations omitted) 
(emphasis added). 
If the names of the plaintiffs are not contained on the notice of claim, the purpose 
behind this statutory provision cannot be fulfilled. The notice of claim is intended to 
provide the government an opportunity to consider and act upon the individual claims 
raised. A notice of claim provides the government the opportunity to rectify any 
problems, evaluate the claim, and consider settling without the expense of litigation. Id. 
at^lO. 
By filing notice of claim in such a manner, Hall deprived the state of the 
opportunity to assess his allegations and to decide, as required by the 
statute, whether to approve or deny the claim. Indeed, without this 
opportunity the state could be hauled into court at every turn and with no 
notice at all—even in cases where a claim is wholly frivolous, can be 
10 
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resolved without lengthy deliberation, or is otherwise suited for resolution 
out of court. 
Hallv.Dep'tofCorr.. 2001 UT 34, ^ [26,24 P.3d 958 (filing of lawsuit before notice of 
claim was denied deprived the courts of subject matter jurisdiction). 
Because the plaintiffs names were not contained in the notice of claim, the courts 
do not have subject matter jurisdiction over their claims, if any, for attorney fees. This 
Court has routinely rejected claims that actual notice is sufficient. Pigs Gun Club. 2002 
UT 17 at TJ10. At most, the notice of claim in question provided inquiry notice. It did not 
provide even actual notice of who might be making a claim, but left the defendants to 
speculate as to what potential plaintiffs might make claims. The notice of claim does not 
meet the requirements of the statute. Strict compliance with this statute is required. Id. 
This appeal should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
B. All Claims of the Plaintiffs Must Appear in the Notice of Claim 
Just as the notice of claim did not state the name of all plaintiffs, it did not assert a 
claim for attorney fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7(4) (1998). The 
Governmental Immunity Act requires that the notice of claim set forth the nature of the 
claim asserted. Utah Code Ann. 63-30-1 l(3)(a)(ii) (Supp. 2003). "[W]here the 
government grants statutory rights of action against itself, any conditions placed on those 
rights must be followed precisely." Hall 2001 UT 34 at f 23. In Yearslev v. Jensen. 798 
P.2d 1127 (Utah 1990), this Court held that a plaintiff could not raise a cause of action 
that was not asserted in her notice of claim. The plaintiff sought to amend her complaint 
11 
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to add a cause of action for malicious prosecution where her notice of claim only asserted 
claims of assault and battery. In finding the notice of claim inadequate for this new 
claim, this Court explained that "[violence would have been done to the requirement of 
section 63-30-1 l(3)(a)(ii)... if the court had permitted the amended complaint to vary so 
profoundly from the notice." 798 P.2d at 1129. See also Stralev v. Hallidav. 2000 UT 
App 38, TJ15,997 P.2d 338 (notice of claim that stated only a representative capacity 
claim against a government employee did not give the courts jurisdiction over a personal 
capacity cause of action). 
Because the plaintiffs' notice of claim did not assert the attorney fees claim that 
they now raise, it fails to provide this Court with subject matter jurisdiction. This appeal 
should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 
II. THIS COURT SHOULD NOT ISSUE AN ADVISORY OPINION 
The plaintiffs ask this Court to advise the district court on how State v. McCoy. 
2000 UT 39,999 P.2d 572, should be interpreted and applied to hypothetical situations. 
No facts are before this Court. The district court's order dealt solely with what discovery 
would be permitted in relationship with an outstanding motion to decertify the class of 
plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have failed to state any facts as to the actual circumstances of 
any potential plaintiff that may be a member of the class in question. 
This Court does not issue mere advisory opinions. Miller v. Weaver. 2003 UT 12, 
TJ26,66 P3d 592; Lvon v. Bateman. 228 P.2d 818, 820 (Utah 1951) (Utah courts are not 
12 
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supposed to be "a forum for hearing academic contentions or rendering advisory 
opinions"). Its decisions are to be based "on an accrued state of facts as opposed to a 
hypothetical state of facts." Baird v. State, 574 P.2d 713, 715 (Utah 1978). But no such 
state of facts is known in this lawsuit. 
In McCoy, this Court dealt with a specific set of facts. The plaintiff was a private 
attorney who had obtained a recovery from a third party for his client. This Court 
determined, based on the facts of that specific case, whether the State of Utah was 
required to pay a proportionate part of the private attorney's fee for obtaining the 
recovery. This Court refused to issue an advisory opinion concerning what the outcome 
of that case would have been if the facts had been different. 2000 UT 39 at f 18, n.4. 
Because the specific facts surrounding the claims of potential members of the 
plaintiff class are unknown, a decision issued on this appeal could only be a mere 
advisory opinion. Whether a specific, currently unknown plaintiff, has a claim for 
attorney fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7(4) (1998) would depend on the facts 
surrounding his or her claim. As the district court noted. 
The relevant factors that the Court of the jury might consider include the 
following: 
(a) Whether the State acted through counsel. 
(b) Whether the proposed settlement was agreed to in principle before the 
State asserted its lien. 
(c) Whether the recipient was in possession of the settlement proceeds. 
(d) Whether the settlement expressly excluded the State's lien. 
(e) Whether under the terms of the settlement payment of the State's lien 
directly reduced the injured party's recovery. 
13 
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(f) Whether the State performed any independent investigation of the merits 
of the third party claim. 
R. 1590-91. This list of potentially significant facts is not complete. It fails to list the 
issue of whether the private attorney's failure to cooperate precluded the State from 
recovering from the responsible third person, the fact situation that this Court refused to 
speculate concerning in McCoy. Many other factors might be relevant to this Court's 
consideration of a particular plaintiffs claim. Without having those facts before the 
Court the proper decision can not be made. 
This Court should refuse to issue an advisory opinion as requested by the 
plaintiffs. Instead, this appeal of a discovery order should be dismissed. A decision on 
the merits of a particular plaintiffs claims should await the accruing of a concrete set of 
facts upon which such a decision could be based. 
IIL THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN 
TO HAVE BEEN AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
The district court's order granted the defendants' motion for a protective order. 
R. 1720, In granting this motion, the district court also denied conflicting discovery 
motions made by the plaintiffs. The discovery that was to be permitted was limited to the 
question of the defendants' motion to decertify the class action. Id. Yet in their brief, the 
plaintiffs do not address the issues presented by this motion. The motion was based on 
the federal and state statutes that prohibit disclosure of the medicaid and health data 
sought in the discovery. R. 1056-60. The defendants also claimed that the sought after 
14 
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discovery was overly broad. R. 1060-64. At most, the plaintiffs may be said to have 
challenged the overbreath question so far as it relates to McCoy, but no other part of the 
order. No effort is made to explain how the limitations placed on discovery concerning 
the motion to decertify the remaining class of plaintiffs was an abuse of discretion. 
This Court reviews the correctness of the district court's decision under an abuse 
of discretion standard. Green v. Louder. 2001 UT 62, p7,29 P.3d 638 ("Because trial 
courts have broad discretion in matters of discovery, this issue is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion."); Pack v. Case. 2001 UT App 232,1fl6, 30 P.3d 436 (denial of a motion to 
compel discovery is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard). 
Plaintiffs have failed to show that the district court's order was an abuse of 
discretion. They have not even challenged the basis for this decision. Instead, the 
plaintiffs seek only an advisory opinion as to how this Court's decision in McCoy should 
be applied to hypothetical situations that are not currently before either this Court or the 
district court. 
The court of appeals' recent decision in Walker v. Office of Recovery Services. 
2004 UT App 101 (a copy of this unpublished opinion is attached as Addendum A) 
supports the conclusion that the district court's decision was not an abuse of discretion.2 
In WalkerT the State of Utah spent its own resources to recover its lien directly from a the 
2
 An unpublished decision of the Utah Court of Appeals is binding on lower courts 
and may be cited, to the degree it is persuasive, to this Court. Grand County v. Rogers. 
2002 UT 25,1J16,44 P.3d 734. 
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liable third party. The court in Walker expressly rejected the broad interpretation of 
McCoy that the plaintiffs put forward in this appeal Instead, the court upheld the trial 
court's decision that the State of Utah does not need to reimburse a private attorney when 
the State expends its own resources to obtain its recovery directly from the responsible 
third party. It was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to come to the same 
conclusion in its discovery order. Indeed, until a further decision from this Court, the 
district court would be bound to follow the court of appeals' decision in Walker. The 
plaintiffs have failed to show that the challenged order was an abuse of discretion. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED THIS COURT'S 
DECISION IN McCOY 
The only issue raised by the plaintiffs is the proper interpretation of Utah Code 
Ann, § 26-19-7(4) (1998). 
(4) The department may not pay more than 33% of its total recovery for 
attorney's fees, but shall pay a proportionate share of the costs in an action 
that is commenced with the department's written consent. 
McCoy decided "that under subsection (4), when the State elects to recover 
directly from a recipient who has expressly excluded the State's claim from any attempt to 
Tecover from a third party, the State must pay the attorney fees incurred in procuring the 
State's share of the settlement proceeds." 2000 UT 39 at ^ [18. 
The challenged district court's decision simply followed this Court's decision in 
McCoy. "Under the McCoy case holding and its supporting facts, the State of Utah must 
pay attorney fees incurred in procuring its share of settlement proceeds where at a 
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minimum an injured recipient of State medical assistance hires an attorney to recover 
damages from a third party, and the State elects to recover its claim directly from the 
recipient" R. 1720. 
The district court simply sought to apply the language of this Court's opinion. It is 
the plaintiffs who seek to have this Court reconsider McCoy, and other decisions, instead 
of reviewing the actual decision of the district court. None of the other issues raised by 
the plaintiffs were addressed by the district court's order and they should not be decided 
on this appeal. 
Plaintiffs ask this Court to amend McCoy to require the State of Utah to pay 
private attorney fees even if the state recovers its lien directly from a third party and not 
from the Medicaid recipient. Appellants' Brief at 29-33,37-39. This is contrary to the 
decision in McCoy. 
In sum, while the Act provides discretion to the State when selecting 
a suitable avenue for recovering medical assistance, each method of 
recovery requires the State to pay its share of attorney fees. The State may 
(1) take action directly against the third party, for which the State pays its 
own expenses; (2) grant consent to recipients seeking to pursue the State's 
claim, whereby the State's recovery will be reduced by reasonable attorney 
fees and, if any, its proportionate share of the costs of an action; or (3) 
refuse consent and proceed against the recipient after the recipient recovers 
from the third party, in which case the State's recovery shall be reduced by 
reasonable attorney fees. 
Id, at 119. 
Plaintiffs ask not that the State of Utah pay its own expenses under the first 
alternative, but that it be required to pay the attorney fees for a private counsel who did 
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not assist in the State's recovery. Such a recovery does not promote fairness. Instead 
such a rule would encourage the State of Utah to never seek to recover its lien from the 
liable third party. The State of Utah, by doing so, would spend its own time and resources 
and still have to pay for a private attorney whose services it did not use. In order to save 
scarce resources, the State of Utah would have an incentive to always seek reimbursement 
from the recipient. This result is poor public policy. 
This is also contrary to the court of appeals' decision in Walker. 2004 UT App 
101. There the court upheld a trial court's decision that the State did not have to 
reimburse a private attorney when it spent its own resources to investigate and seek 
reimbursement. This result encourages the State of Utah to recover its lien directly from 
the third party, instead of from the Medicaid recipient. 
The plaintiffs also ask this Court to rule, for the first time, that private attorneys 
can recover their fees even if they never sought the State's consent to bring an action 
against the liable third party as required by law. Appellants' Brief at 33-35. The district 
court did not address this issue and it is not part of the challenged decision. R. 1718-21. 
Utah law prohibits Medicaid recipients from filing a claim or commencing an 
action for recovery of medical costs of the same injury or disease for which the the State 
of Utah provided medical assistance without the written consent of the Department of 
Health or the Office of Recovery Services (ORS). Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7(l)(a) 
(1998). Section 7 protects both the liable third party as well as the State "from ill-
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informed or devious actions by the recipient." S.S. v. State. 942 P.2d 439,441 (Utah 
1998)- It also ensures that the recipient's preemptive action does not cost the State its 
right to third party payments which are in settlement or are already in the hands of the 
beneficiary. Id. If the recipient proceeds without Medicaid's written consent, the 
department is not bound by any decision, judgment or settlement and it may recover the 
medical assistance it provided form either the recipient or from any party to which the 
proceeds were made payable. Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7(2)(a) (1998). "Payments made 
by a third party do not legally become property of the recipient until after a valid 
settlement which necessarily must include reimbursement to Medicaid." S.S. v. State. 
942 P.2d at 441. Reviewing the statutes as a whole, a Medicaid recipient's attorney is 
prohibited from recovering attorney fees if consent is not sought. 
The district court did not address the issue of cooperation raised by the plaintiffs. 
Appellants' Brief at 43-44. It is not properly before this Court on this appeal. This issue 
is factually intensive and not conducive to being decided in the current appeal that is 
devoid of any factual setting. 
The district court's order simply followed this Court's decision in McCoy. It did 
not seek to answer all hypothetical questions and applications left open by McCov. The 
district court's decision should be affirmed on appeal. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the above stated reasons, the defendants ask this Court to dismiss this appeal 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and because it seeks an advisory opinion. If this 
Court reaches the merits of this appeal, it should affirm the district court's discovery 
order because the district court did not abuse its discretion. 
Respectfully submitted this i f / ^ d a y of June, 2004. 
A 
BRENT A. BURNETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendants - Appellees 
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Petitioners argue that the Office of Recovery Services (ORS) should 
share in their attorney fees because their attorney recovered the 
funds that fully satisfied the State's Medicaid lien. ORS counters 
that it should not pay any of Petitioners1 attorney fees because it 
expended its own efforts to collect on the lien, and did not consent 
to Petitioners' representation. 
When seeking to recover medical costs paid to a Medicaid recipient, 
the State may (1) take action directly against the third party, for 
which the State pays its own expenses; (2) grant consent to 
recipients seeking to pursue the State's claim, whereby the State's 
recovery will be reduced by reasonable attorney fees . . . ; or (3) 
refuse consent and proceed against the recipient after the recipient 
recovers from the third party, in which case the State's recovery 
shall be reduced by reasonable attorney fees. 
State v. McCoy, 2000 UT 39,119, 999 P.2d 572. Petitioners argue that 
the trial court erred in concluding that the present case fits under 
the first collection approach described in McCoy. We disagree. 
Petitioners' granddaughter, A.B.W., was injured in an accident and 
treated by Intermountain Health Care (IHC). ORS was notified by IHC 
of the accident and of a third party who was potentially liable for 
A-B.W.'s expenses. ORS immediately contacted A.B.W.'s mother and 
inquired about the facts and circumstances of the accident. Later 
that day, ORS identified State Farm as the third party, and proceeded 
to speak with an adjuster for State Farm. The adjuster admitted that 
State Farm accepted responsibility for the accident. The following 
dayr ORS sent a Notice of Lien to State Farm and Petitioners' 
counsel. The Notice of Lien included a cover page stating that the 
State was working to recover the full amount of the lien from State 
Farm and that ORS would not pay any attorney fees for efforts by 
Petitioners' counsel without a prior written collection agreement. 
Nearly eleven months after the accident, or six months after ORS had 
filed its claim, Petitioners' counsel requested ORS's consent to 
enter into a collection agreement to pursue the Medicaid claim. ORS 
denied the request, stating that ORS had already investigated the 
case and State Farm had accepted liability. After denying consent, 
ORS advised State Farm that Petitioners' counsel did not represent 
the State's claim and demanded direct payment from State Farm. We 
conclude that, on its own initiative, ORS discovered the identity of 
the third party, filed a Notice of Lien, and obtained State Farm's 
admission of liability. ORS spent its own resources to investigate 
and seek reimbursement before any request was made by Petitioners' 
counsel. 
The third option identified in McCoy is inapplicable to this case. 
See 2000 UT 39 at 519. The Medical Benefits Recovery Act provides 
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against a third party for recovery of medical costs . . . for which 
the department has provided 
• • • medical assistance, without the department's written consent." 
Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7(1) (a) (1998). A Medicaid recipient must 
therefore "seek the State's consent before attempting to recover from 
a third party for any medical costs paid by the State." McCoy, 2000 
UT 39 at 114. Here, while it is true that Petitioners' counsel sought 
consent from ORS before trying to recover from State Farm, such 
consent was not forthcoming. 
We therefore affirm.-^ -J-
Russell W. Bench, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
1. Petitioners also argue that it would be unfair to them not to 
require ORS to pay their attorney fees because ORS benefitted from 
Petitioners1 actions. While a court has inherent equitable power to 
award reasonable attorney fees when it deems it appropriate in the 
interest of justice and equity, it can do so only "in the absence of 
a statutory or contractual authorization." Stewart v. Utah Pub. Serv. 
Comm'n, 885 P.2d 759, 782 (Utah 1994). Here, the Medical Benefits 
Recovery Act clearly applies. 
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